I want to discuss something that does not directly deal with neuroscience, at least not immediately. It’s something that has been on my mind lately and I ask myself, “Why not blog about it?” What I’ve been thinking about is the idea of thought insertion. In psychiatry, thought insertion is a symptom where the patient reports feeling like certain thoughts are not their thoughts. For them, it feels like the thought is being inserted into their mind against their will. This is common in some cases of OCD, other mental disorders involving some sort of psychosis, and less known about disorders involving thought disturbances. These thoughts are nonvolitional and can supposedly be contrasted with the volitional thinking we do otherwise.
What is the difference between a nonvolitional and a volitional thought? The answer might at first appear obvious. Well, in the former case the thought occurs without our willing it, and in the later case the thought is willed. How do we know this? Let us take a look at what each thought consists of. Say I have the thought, “The Yankees are based out of New York City.” And then later I have the thought, “chicken, chicken, cow, disease, dirt.” I report the first thought as volitional. It arose spontaneously in my mind. It caused no anxiety or any kind of emotional response. Most importantly, although probably not as salient, I, upon thinking the thought, also had the intuition that this was my thought and I willed it. The later thought was not reported as volitional. The later thought also arose spontaneously in my mind. But this thought caused me marked anxiety (only hypothetically. I didn’t actually have either of these thoughts. Although I could easily think both right now.) It also did not come with the corresponding intuition that it was indeed my thought. Where do both of these intuitions come from? Why do I intuit the first thought as volitional and the second thought as nonvolitional?
If we strip away the intuition from the content of each thought what is left? The thoughts’ spontaneity and the emotion that each involves or causes. Would it be too bold to suggest that neither thought is volitional? Would it be too audacious to suggest that the only reason we have the experience of a free thought at all is because usually, baring any psychological illness, our thoughts are not accompanied by great anxiety? I think some of the diagnostic tools we used, the concepts we use, need to be more thoroughly examined. I also think that, given the recent assault on free will by neuroscience, what we consider volitional and nonvolitional needs to be considered more carefully. Next time you think a thought, ask yourself, “Was that me thinking that or someone else?”